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Can Curriculum Respond to the
“crisis of technology”?
Curriculum Oriented Towards World
Cameron Duncan and Matthew J. Kruger-Ross

A cursory look at current education policy suggests a transformation of
education into something analogous to job training. The purpose of such policy is
to orient education to fit the needs of a technologically oriented market system. The
related demand to quantify all student progress is a manifestation of the instrumental
reason that has troubled the thinkers of modernity and capitalism. It finds its common
measure in technology. Instrumental reason can be thought of as the stripping down
of reason into inputs and outputs. The embrace of technology and its dominant form
of reason has led to a crisis in curriculum and learning in general. Each wave of
technological innovation promises to be better than the previous, more responsive
and adaptive, and is sure to cure the ills of a broken university or education system.
Though the ways of addressing the form of reason characteristic of technology are
many, the key problem is the reduction of all human activity to narrowly defined ends.
In what follows we explore one way that curriculum may be able to engage
meaningfully with the seemingly never ending cycle of new technologies in education.
We argue that curriculum cannot respond to any such crisis of technology without
embracing the concrete characteristics of human action and experience. We elaborate
on philosopher Martin Heidegger’s notion of “world” as it offers a greater ontologically
sensitivity that can greatly benefit further curricular and educational inquiry.
To speak of curriculum in general is no easy task. It involves many places,
people and histories and is constantly evolving. It is reasonable to presume a definition
of curriculum that formally indicates the what of teaching and learning. Curriculum,
then, is something laid out and planned by teachers or curriculum designers for learners.
Educators speak of the curriculum for 21st century students, for example, and develop
elaborate systems of objectives and outcomes that enumerate an abstract concept of
curriculum. In a different tone curriculum theorists also try to create, implement and
evaluate a curriculum that takes into account the needs of the students. However, in
treating curriculum as an object, both forms of curriculum perpetuate the dominance
of instrumental reason and action. Sadly, the embrace of technology has blurred
the distinction between the needs of students and the needs of the market system it
serves. How might an ontological sensitivity to human activity itself allow educators to
overcome this divide? The following is an explication of an orientation that we hope
will inspire curriculum theorists to begin to think ontologically about the crisis at hand.
Heidegger’s (1927) project in Being and Time is centered on the rejection of the
Cartesian subject-object orientation. This position is usually attributed to Descartes
(1637) in his work Discourse on Method where he explains how the sovereign subject
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removes his or herself from participatory action in the world in order to treat it as
the source of knowledge. The world becomes the object from which knowledge is
derived. The relation is one where all knowledge rests on the knowing subject, who
simultaneously imparts it onto and derives it from the world. In this way the world is
represented as an objective thing that lends itself to technical manipulation. Ends, and
not human action, become the structural basis.
The radical break from Cartesianism in Heidegger’s early work is best
described in his notion of world. In his understanding, world is revealed to human beings
when they use things that occupy it. Here Heidegger is not describing the physical or
natural world, but rather indicating the interconnected web of significance that always
already exists regardless of our awareness. It is only in concrete activity that humans
are able to trace the relations that comprise a world. The most basic characteristic of
human beings is that they exist in a world. Again, one must not hear in as referencing
spatial reality but rather as an “in-connection-to.” The manner in which in everyday
language we speak of the “world of sports” indicates Heidegger’s meaning. In the
introduction to Being and Time, Heidegger points out that human beings already and
always find themselves in reference to a world because humans are involved (or, we
cope) contextually with their surroundings.
Humanity’s general set of coping skills potentially open us to everything. They
allows us to mesh with and derive our being from the things we encounter. Humans
encounter things as significant, and in doing so, reveal a world. We suggest that
thinking through our practical relations offers the opportunity to orient curriculum
towards world.
Heidegger explains:
Things at hand are encountered within the world… World is
always already ‘there’ in all things at hand. World is already
discovered beforehand together with everything encountered,
although not thematically. However, it can also appear in certain
ways of dealing with the surrounding world. World is that in
terms of which things at hand are at hand for us. (2010, pp. 81-82)
Things that are ready for use are qualitatively different from other things
and, thus, irreducible to quantitative understanding. By involving ourselves with the
entities that occupy the world, specific things and other beings, we refer to other things
and structures. On its own, a given tool is useless. Only when a tool is brought into
concrete use does it enter into relations with things like materials, the workshop and
the multitude of relations that went into constructing the tool and delivering it into the
hand of the human. When all these relations are thought in connection the result is a
whole where each part has a particular place and meaning.
Let us summarize Heidegger’s thesis as follows: human involvement alerts us
to the foreground and background of our world. These phenomena take one back to
the world, which is behind everything as a structural basis: “totality of useful things
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is always already discovered before the individual useful thing” (2010, p. 86). The
underlying structure of world is what allows the concrete character of things at hand
to be selected as appropriate for our involvement. World is something encompassing
that we are practically involved and has meanings which stitch human beings to other
beings and practical activities.
The practical activity upon which the world hangs can be seen as an
opening. The ontological dispensation that Heidegger describes (that we are situated
in a world) is one that can only be accessed through specifics. If we think through the
implications of this ghostly presence of world, where meaning is pointed to in practical
action with concrete things, we are better able to see the meaning of appropriateness
of actions for dealing with certain situations. The human character of our relations
is put into focus rather than conformity to outcomes of human planning. It gives new
possibilities to see our relations through practical action and not mechanical pieces
within a larger framework. In thinking the world in this matter, what were prescribed
ends become openings. The embrace of qualitative difference is an essential step to
orienting curriculum towards world.
What would it mean to have curriculum where action is oriented towards
world? Such a curriculum would be loosely structured, taking into account the everyday
involvements of its participants. It would point us to what is appropriate to deal with
particular issues, challenges and needs. These selections would challenge teachers
to think through the implications of their involvements with particular students in
a manner that not only addresses their concrete lived situation but also brings the
student back to the larger structural framework of meanings that they are involved in.
When we inquire into current curricular models and theories, we find a
remarkable lack of attention to world. Learning objectives and skill sets are treated as
neutral and interchangeable, rather than inherently and irrevocably connected webs
of significance. Curriculum, whether designed by teachers or according to the needs
of students, remains grounded in the assumption that knowledge is simply another
(human) resource, a cog in a wheel of the factory. The later Heidegger will name this
phenomenon Gestell, the positioning of any and everything as a resource for human
mastery and control. The “crisis” of technology can be addressed by curriculum
only once a greater ontological sensitivity to world is given. Following Heidegger’s
thinking to its logical conclusion, if human beings are always already in a world, then
the curricular worlds in which we live and conduct scholarship are drastically reduced
from what could be possible within curriculum. For example, to begin we could explore
how “crisis of technology” could be understood not as crisis but as one possible world
References
Heidegger, M. (2010). Being and Time. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. Albany: SUNY
Press. Original work published 1927.

Antistasis

29

Biographies
Cameron Duncan is a Doctoral Student in the Department of Curriculum and
Pedagogy at the University of British Columbia, working from Phenomenology to
Reimagine the Contemporary University. He writes on Continental Philosophy,
Marxism and Curriculum Theory. He can be reached at cameron.duncan@alumni.
ubc.ca
Matthew J. Kruger-Ross recently completed his Doctorate at Simon Fraser University,
where he explored how such Heideggerian distinctions as world, enframing and
attunement could be used to explore what is possible in teaching and learning. His
research interests include Philosophy of Education, in particular the existential
phenomenology of Martin Heidegger. He can be reached at mkrugerr@sfu.ca

